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I. INTRODUCTION: PULLING BACK THE CURTAIN ON FOOD SAFETY 
In the penultimate scene of the classic film The Wizard of Oz,1 Dor-
othy and her fellow travelers—Scarecrow, Tin Man, and Cowardly Li-
on—have returned to the Emerald City, carrying with them a broom—
proof that they achieved their mission of slaying the Wicked Witch of the 
West. Standing in the throne room of the palace, and having already pre-
sented the broom, the fearsome visage of the Wizard floats before them 
and tells them, “Go away and come back tomorrow.” Dorothy challenges 
the Wizard to keep his promise to send her home, to which the Wizard 
responds fiercely, “Do not arouse the wrath of the Great and Powerful 
Oz!” It is at this point that Dorothy’s dog, Toto, runs to one side and 
pulls back a curtain, revealing the subterfuge that manufactures the float-
ing image of the Wizard, the thunderclaps, and his booming voice. In-
stead of being both the source and by-product of awesome magic, the 
Wizard is revealed to be merely the result of technological wizardry, a 
stunt performed for a public all too willing, indeed wanting, to believe in 
such magic. 
Realizing that the reality of his mundane status has been revealed, 
the Wizard (should it be “Wizard” now?) shouts, “Pay no attention to 
that man behind the curtain!” Of course, the reality cannot now be un-
seen; once revealed, there is no further act of subterfuge or concealment 
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 1. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939). The ultimate, or final, scene in the film 
is, of course, when Dorothy, following the direction of Glinda the Good Witch, clicks the heels of 
the ruby slippers together three times while repeating the famous phrase, “There’s no place like 
home,” thus transporting her from Oz back to Kansas. 
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that can fully undo (or erase) the revelation. And it is for this reason that 
both Dorothy and the Wizard are forced into a new kind of relationship, a 
rapprochement that requires an integration of a new reality, one that al-
lows no room for the magical thinking of before. 
The history of food safety in the United States has, since at least the 
second half of the nineteenth century, played out along lines remarkably 
similar to the scene from The Wizard of Oz just described. Despite 
knowledge that commerce in food is a profit-driven enterprise, the public 
has consistently put great faith in the wholesomeness and safety of the 
food being purchased.2 To some extent, such faith is necessary, even if 
not always justified. In making the decision to put a bite of food in one’s 
own mouth, or the mouth of a friend or family member, a form of faith or 
trust must accompany the act of eating. For who would knowingly eat 
food suspected to be unsafe? But that is precisely what millions of people 
do every year, with a great many of them falling ill as a result.3 It is true 
that only a small minority of those made ill ever learn what particular 
food item was the cause and what particular manufacturer was responsi-
ble.4 It is, however, no secret that food, in general, is a significant cause 
of illness each year, and is not as safe as it could be if made with greater 
care under more effective and transparent regulatory oversight.5 And it is 
                                                 
 2. See Denis W. Stearns, On (Cr)edibility: Why Food in the United States May Never Be Safe, 
21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 248–50, 249 n.12 (2010) [hereinafter Stearns, On (Cr)edibility] 
(explaining how the profitability of food depends in part on the ability to avoid investment in im-
proved safety, causing significant amounts of foodborne illness that is never traced to its source). 
 3. See John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illnesses, Hospitalizations, and Death to 
Food Commodities by Using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998–2008, 19 EMERGING INFECT. DIS. 
407, 409–10 (2013) (estimating that over nine million persons each year suffer a foodborne illness 
due to a major pathogen, a category that includes E. coli O157:H7). 
 4. Stearns, On (Cr)edibility, supra note 2, at 249 n.12 (citing two studies in support of assertion 
that a “vast majority of foodborne illness in the United States is, each year, attributable to unidenti-
fied food items”). See also Painter et al., supra note 3, at 407 (explaining results of the study con-
firmed how and why outbreaks are so important to understanding the extent of foodborne illness 
because “linking an illness to a particular food is rarely possible except during an outbreak”). 
 5. For example, a 2014 GAO report concluded that, despite the USDA Food Safety and Inspec-
tion Service (FSIS) launching an initiative in 2006 to reduce Salmonella in raw meat and poultry, a 
2013 food safety progress report found “Salmonella infections in humans have not decreased, and 
the incidence of Campylobacter in humans increased by 13% in 2013 compared with previous years 
from 2006 through 2008 based on CDC’s long-term comparison.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO–14–744, FOOD SAFETY: USDA NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN ITS APPROACH TO 
PROTECTING HUMAN HEALTH FROM PATHOGENS IN POULTRY PRODUCTS 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666231.pdf. See also Alvin Schupp et al., Impacts of Selected, Me-
dia-Reported Beef Safety Problems on Consumer Beef Purchases, 31 SW. ECON. REV. 13, 14 (2004) 
(“While the industry has made strides in reducing the incidence of [pathogen-related] safety prob-
lems, they have proven to be difficult to eliminate.”). When researchers such as the authors of the 
just-cited study, aligned and funded by the meat industry, note the difficulty of eliminating the risk 
of pathogens from meat, what is consistently not said is that this difficulty is wholly a consequence 
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precisely because food both could be safer, and is so often found to be 
unsafe, that the dynamic of concealment and revelation so inevitably 
leads to either denial or despair on the part of the public, with “consum-
ers often feel[ing] powerless with reference to avoiding food safety prob-
lems.”6 
Notwithstanding the repeated assertions of the United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) and food industry officials to the con-
trary, the food supply in the United States is not the safest in the world.7 
When faced with the ubiquity of unsafe food in the United States, the 
public has few choices beyond simply opting out of eating certain cate-
gories of food. For example, given the number of outbreaks linked to 
fresh sprouts, there is simply no way that I would ever eat sprouts again.8 
Moreover, we know that raw poultry is so commonly contaminated with 
Salmonella and Campylobacter that consumers are instructed to assume 
that all poultry purchased is contaminated, and then to handle and cook 
the meat accordingly.9 But would the poultry industry accept a warning 
                                                                                                             
of not being able to eliminate the risk while keeping the prices the same. Interestingly, these same 
researchers go on to say that irradiation would be one means of eliminating the risk, but this process 
“has not been accepted by many consumers.” Id. But note that irradiation is a process that eliminates 
the contamination on meat that is placed there as a result of the slaughtering process. There is no 
need to eliminate contamination if the slaughtering process does not contaminate the meat in the first 
place. 
 6. Schupp et al., supra note 5, at 13. 
 7. See, e.g., THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS & CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, MEAT AND 
POULTRY INSPECTION 2.0: HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM THE PRACTICES AND 
INNOVATIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES 20 (2014), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/ 
Assets/2014/10/Meat_and_Poultry_Inspection_ARTFINAL_v5.pdf?la=en (concluding that “inspec-
tion methods developed in the early 1900s still form the backbone of meat inspection programs [in 
the United States]” and that such methods “are much less effective in protecting consumers from the 
modern-day hazards that commonly contaminate meat and poultry products”); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–08–794, FOOD SAFETY: SELECTED COUNTRIES’ SYSTEMS CAN 
OFFER INSIGHTS INTO ENSURING IMPORT SAFETY AND RESPONDING TO FOODBORNE ILLNESS 2 
(2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/276340.pdf (finding that food safety systems in 
the United States are lacking when compared to eight other countries, in large part because of how 
fragmented the federal food safety system is and how that fragmentation causes “inconsistent over-
sight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources”). 
 8. The primary federal website for food safety information advises that the elderly, children, 
pregnant women, and immune-compromised persons should not eat sprouts. See U.S. Dept. of 
Health & Human Servs., Sprouts: What You Should Know, FOODSAFETY.GOV, 
http://www.foodsafety.gov/keep/types/fruits/sprouts.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2015) (noting that 
“[s]ince 1996, there have been at least 30 reported outbreaks of foodborne illness associated with 
different types of raw and lightly cooked sprouts”). 
 9. See USDA FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., FOOD SAFETY INFORMATION: CHICKEN 
FROM FARM TO TABLE (2014), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/ad74bb8d-
1dab-49c1-b05e-390a74ba7471/Chicken_from_Farm_to_Table.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (noting that 
“[a]s on any perishable meat, fish or poultry, bacteria can be found on raw or undercooked chick-
en”). A study published in 2001, which was based on the testing of 825 samples of raw chicken 
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label beyond the currently benign one that states, “Some food products 
may contain bacteria that could cause illness if the product is mishandled 
or cooked improperly”?10 Of course not. Because to provide the public 
with more specific information about the harmful bacteria invisibly pre-
sent on meat and poultry would risk an act of revelation like that which 
dethroned the Wizard of Oz, revealing him to be a mere huckster, a for-
mer peddler of patent medicines that promised miraculous cures that 
could never be had. In short, the meat industry does “not want package 
labels to suggest that anything might be inherently wrong with their 
products.”11 
The meat industry and the USDA are in many respects the same as 
the “Wizard,” putting on an act that it hopes convinces the public to be-
lieve that the industry wields mighty powers. It promises safety, and 
wants such promises to be credible, because without credibility its prod-
ucts will not be purchased and consumed. The strategy is less about the 
actual delivery of safety than it is about preserving the credibility of the 
promise of safety. For so long as the promise of safety is believed, the 
public will continue to purchase and eat meat. And that is why the fact of 
federal inspection is so important; without the seeming guarantee from 
                                                                                                             
purchased at grocery stores, found that over 70% of the chicken was positive for Campylobacter. See 
generally C. Zhoa et al., Prevalence of Campylobacter spp., Escherichia coli, and Salmonella 
Serovars in Retail Chicken, Turkey, Pork, and Beef from the Greater Washington, D.C. Area, 67 
APPLIED ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 5431–36 (2001). In 1996, USDA established Salmonella perfor-
mance standards with the goal of reducing, not eliminating, the prevalence of bacterial pathogens in 
meat and poultry. See FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV., PROGRESS REPORT ON SALMONELLA 
AND CAMPYLOBACTER TESTING OF RAW MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS, 1998–2012 (2012), avail-
able at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/8d792eef-f44d-4ccb-8e25-ef5bdb4c1dc8/ 
Progress-Report-Salmonella-Campylobacter-CY2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (noting in almost im-
penetrable prose and difficult-to-decipher statistics that a majority of establishments (73.14% for 
chicken) had 50% or fewer positive test results than that set as the Salmonella performance standard 
goal). 
 10. 9 C.F.R. § 317.2 (1)(1)(i) (2015) (dictating that the quoted language appear on all meat that 
is destined for household consumers). The full text of the “Safe Handling Label” can be found on the 
USDA website here: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safety-education/teach-
others/download-materials/image-libraries/safe-handling-label-text/ct_index. The exact language of 
the warning label was negotiated with the food industry, which had won a preliminary injunction 
that prevented the USDA from issuing an earlier version of the warning label as an “emergency” 
measure in response to the Jack in the Box outbreak. See Tex. Food Indus. Assoc. v. USDA, 842 F. 
Supp. 254, 260–61 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (finding that harm that the warning label rule threatened to 
impose on food industry outweighed any damage that the injunction might cause). See also MARION 
NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND BIOTERRORISM 76–80 (2003) (describing 
industry efforts to block warning labels in favor of continuing to use “consumer education” as pri-
mary means of preventing illness). 
 11. NESTLE, supra note 10, at 77. In response to industry complaints, the USDA made a num-
ber of concessions, including limiting the proposed rule to ground meat and poultry. Id. Despite 
these concessions, three industry groups still decided to sue. Id. 
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the USDA that meat is safe because it has been “[i]nspected and passed,” 
the public might pay greater attention to the fact that neither the USDA 
nor the meat industry claims that meat is free of pathogens as a result of 
it having been inspected. Indeed, in agreeing with the position taken by 
the USDA in resisting (along with industry) an attempt to require warn-
ing labels on meat, in 1974 the D.C. Circuit agreed that “Congress did 
not intend the [mark of inspection] to import a finding that meat and 
poultry products were free from salmonellae.”12 
For that reason, among others, the metaphor of the “Wizard” is an 
apt one when applied to the meat industry: it hides behind the curtain of 
federal meat inspection, and uses the amplified voice of the USDA mark 
of inspection to assure the public that the meat it buys has been assuredly 
determined to be wholesome and safe for consumption. What else could 
be meant by the first sentence in the USDA-mandated Safe Handling 
Instructions: “This product was prepared from inspected and passed meat 
and/or poultry.”13 Despite the second sentence that warns “products may 
contain bacteria,” and that illness could result “if the product is mishan-
dled or cooked improperly,”14 the phrase “inspected and passed” plainly 
implies a process that is supposed to ensure that the meat is free of path-
ogens. Indeed, observe what a main meat industry website proclaims 
                                                 
 12. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n v. Butz, 511 F.2d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming grant of 
summary judgment against effort to require USDA to place warning labels on meat because inspec-
tion methods were insufficient against microorganisms like Salmonella). The warning sought by 
APHA at the time read as follows: 
Caution: Improper handling and inadequate cooking of this product may be hazardous to 
your health. Despite careful government inspection, some disease-producing organisms 
may be present. Consult your local health department for information on the safe han-
dling and preparation of this product. 
Id. at 333. In refusing to require the USDA to use the warning, the court quoted from the USDA’s 
letter to the court in which the agency had stated its then position, to which the court added on a 
memorable conclusion, as follows: 
As the Department said in its letter of August 18, 1971 “the American consumer knows 
that raw meat and poultry are not sterile and, if handled improperly, perhaps could cause 
illness.” In other words, American housewives and cooks normally are not ignorant or 
stupid and their methods of preparing and cooking of food do not ordinarily result in 
[S]almonellosis. 
Id. Although the court did not itself rule on whether the USDA could declare Salmonella to be a 
declarant under the FMIA, the USDA would subsequently act as if that was what had occurred, 
doing so as a means of justifying its inaction in combatting Salmonella. 
 13. 9 C.F.R. § 317.2(l)(2) (2015). The safe handling instructions “shall accompany every meat 
or meat product . . . destined for household consumers, hotels, restaurants, or similar institutions and 
shall appear on the label.” 9 C.F.R. § 317.2(l)(1)(i) (2015). Identical instructions are required for 
poultry products. 9 C.F.R. § 381.125 (2015). 
 14. 9 C.F.R. § 317.2(l)(2) (2015). 
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with regard to the role of the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) 
and meat inspection: 
The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for ensuring that 
meat, poultry and egg products are safe, wholesome, and accurately 
labeled. FSIS enforces the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry 
Products Inspection Act, and the Egg Products Inspection Act, 
which require the federal inspection of meat and poultry products 
prepared for distribution in commerce for use as human food.15 
Despite a 1998 transformation in federal meat inspection intended to give 
“industry, not [g]overnment, the primary responsibility for ensuring the 
safety of meat and poultry products,”16 industry has continued to advance 
the narrative that it is federal regulation and inspection that is the guaran-
tor of safety, as shown by the mark of inspection. As such, the public 
continues to be invited to believe in the USDA as “great and powerful,” 
just like the Wizard of Oz. 
To examine the role of the federal government in the regulation of 
meat safety, and the way the meat industry uses the fact of regulation to 
perpetuate the credibility of its products and its safety promises, this Ar-
ticle argues that what matters most to both the government and industry 
is consumer confidence in safety, and not safety itself. Without sufficient 
consumer confidence in the safety of meat, both sales and the govern-
ment’s credibility suffer. As a result, the interests of industry and gov-
ernment align in protecting the credibility of the regulatory system as a 
whole, even where that alignment of interests is at the expense of public 
health. Moreover, because the narrative of a “great and powerful” regula-
tory system is, in the end, reassuring to a public that needs and wants 
reassurance, it is only when facts of sufficiently disturbing power are 
revealed that the status quo is challenged and systemic change becomes 
                                                 
 15. Am. Meat Inst., Inspection: Labeling, MEATSAFETY.ORG, http://www.meatsafety.org/ht/d/ 
sp/i/26846/pid/26846 (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). The Meatsafety.org website is sponsored by the 
American Meat Institute (AMI). Id. The AMI is now known as the North American Meat Institute 
(NAMI) as a result of a merger with the North American Meat Association in 2015. Id. The descrip-
tion of the AMI’s history on the NAMI website states that “[t]he American Meat Institute (AMI) was 
founded in Chicago, IL in 1906 just after the passage of the Federal Meat Inspection Act, one of the 
first U.S. laws to set federal food processing standards. . . . In 2006, AMI celebrated its 100 year 
anniversary as a leading trade association for the meat and poultry industry.” History, N. AM. MEAT 
INST., http://www.meatinstitute.org/ht/d/sp/i/232/pid/232 (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
 16. Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Excel Corp., 665 N.W.2d 417, 430 (2003) (quoting 
USDA Office of Inspector Gen., FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
HAZARD ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL CONTROL POINT SYSTEM, Rep. No. 24001-3-At, at 1 (2000)). 
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inevitable. To resist or avoid this change, it becomes necessary to sup-
press doubt about safety as a means of maintaining consumer confidence, 
and to keep concealed facts that would otherwise give rise to such 
doubts. Such suppression and concealment also leads—and has, in fact, 
led—to industry efforts to deter those who might seek to call attention to 
food safety risks or shocking production practices. 
In looking at the dynamics of concealment and revelation, and the 
effects on food safety, Part II of this Article looks at the origins of feder-
al food regulations in revelations of production practices that so disgust-
ed the public that industry embraced the need for regulation to restore 
consumer confidence and thus protect sales. In Part III, this Article looks 
at another form of revelation, this one involving claims made about po-
tential food safety risks, claims that call into question the safety of a par-
ticular product, causing sales to fall. Lacking any regulatory response, 
this time industry went to court, filing product disparagement lawsuits. 
Part IV of this Article explores a recent product disparagement lawsuit in 
more detail, a lawsuit in which a meat processor alleged that its prod-
uct—lean finely textured beef—was disparaged by being called “pink 
slime,” causing huge financial losses when sales of the product plum-
meted. Finally, this Article concludes by arguing that visibility and 
transparency are prerequisites to increased food safety; even if the public 
would rather not know the details about how meat is produced, it is only 
if the curtain is pulled back, and reality revealed, that sustained progress 
toward a real increase in food safety can finally be achieved. 
II. THE WILLFUL SUSPENSION OF DISBELIEF: THE GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE, INSTEAD OF FOOD SAFETY 
“The history of food safety legislation and rulemaking in the United 
States is largely one of reaction.”17 
 
Looking at the history of federal food laws, beginning in 1906 
when the first such laws were enacted,18 it is apparent that the real goal 
of the laws was not to ensure safe and wholesome food. Instead, the goal 
                                                 
 17. Denis Stearns, Preempting Food Safety: An Examination of USDA Rulemaking and Its E. 
coli O157:H7 Policy in Light of Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Excel Corporation, 1 J. FOOD L. 
& POL. 375, 388 (2005) [hereinafter Stearns, Preempting Food Safety] (providing details of the 
outbreak, including its epidemiology and the resulting investigation). 
 18. The Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) and Meat Inspection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 34 Stat. 1260 (1907). 
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was to restore consumer confidence.19 After the publication of The Jun-
gle20—a novel portraying unsanitary practices in the United States’ 
meatpacking industry—the sale of meat plummeted, prompting the in-
dustry to seek out government regulation as a means of showing the pub-
lic that the safety of meat could be trusted.21 With passage of the Federal 
Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), meat was subject to continuous federal 
inspection, certified by a federal mark of inspection placed on all meat 
products sold in interstate commerce stating “USDA Inspected and 
[P]assed.”22 And even better, in the view of the still powerful meat indus-
try, Congress was ultimately convinced to let the cost of inspection be 
borne by taxpayers, a cost shifting that resulted in “considerable bitter-
ness” among several of the senators who had sought passage of the Act.23 
                                                 
 19. Roger Roots, A Muckraker’s Aftermath: The Jungle of Meatpacking Regulation After a 
Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 2413, 2414 (2001) (“About the only aspect of federal meat 
inspection laws that all critics agree with is that federal meat quality laws were originally intended to 
counteract the hysteria created by The Jungle.”). See also Stearns, Preempting Food Safety, supra 
note 17, at 375–76 & nn.66–67 (discussing publication of The Jungle as a kind of “tipping point” for 
enactment of federal food regulation, and citing multiple authorities making the same or similar 
point). 
 20. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). 
 21. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 461 (2d ed. 1985). Accord 
Roots, supra note 19, at 2419 (citing FRIEDMAN and writing about how loss of sales so damaged 
“the pocketbooks of meat-packing companies that many of them actually sought out government 
regulation” (emphasis in original)); C.C. Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legisla-
tion, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 13 (1933) (“[Packers] began to realize that government inspec-
tion was the only thing that could save their business[es], for that alone could restore the confidence 
of the public[.]”). But see Dennis R. Johnson, The History of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act and 
the Meat Inspection Act, 37 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 5, 9 (1982) (noting that the release of a 
report commissioned by President Roosevelt—the Neill–Reynolds Report—did as much to hurt 
meat sales (“cut in half”) and increase industry support for passage of the Act); Arlene Finger Kan-
tor, Upton Sinclair and the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906: “I Aimed at the Public’s Heart and 
By Accident I Hit It in the Stomach”, 66 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1202, 1202–05 (1976) (noting that 
public reaction to the Neill–Reynolds report helped assure passage of the laws). 
 22. For the statutory provision governing the mark of inspection, see 21 U.S.C. § 606 (declar-
ing that “inspectors shall mark, stamp, tag, or label as ‘Inspected and passed’ all such products found 
to be not adulterated; and said inspectors shall label, mark, stamp, or tag as ‘Inspected and con-
demned’ all such products found adulterated”). 
 23. Regier, supra note 21, at 15. During the Senate debate, one senator memorably declared, 
“The most loathsome and slimy criminal that curses the earth is the one that adulterates food.” Id. He 
further declared: 
Honesty and decency stand stupified [sic] before the effrontery of the demands of these 
criminals—that the people pay the cost of the inspection. What is their proposition? That 
the people shall pay to have them stop their filthy and dangerous practices; that the peo-
ple shall pay to compel them to obey the law; that the people shall pay to stop them from 
defrauding and robbing the public; that the people shall pay to prevent them from de-
stroying life and spreading disease; that the people shall pay to stop them from poisoning 
and murdering the innocent and helpless! A proposition more monstrous never came 
from the polluted lips of crime. 
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Certainly, the stated goal of the FMIA was to prohibit the sale of 
“adulterated” or “misbranded” food.24 But such a prohibition was in 
many respects beside the point. It was the continued sale of meat that 
was to be protected, the regulation and inspection being a necessary 
grease to keep the wheels of commerce spinning. That sales of certain 
products were from time to time prevented is undoubtedly true.25 Just as 
true is that industry often challenged some of the regulatory restrictions 
imposed, often with success.26 Nonetheless, if you had gone at any point 
to a segment of industry and offered an exemption from the law, or of-
fered to remove inspectors from facilities, it is incredibly unlikely that 
any company would have ever accepted the offer. To do so would have 
been to commit economic suicide, giving market share to competitors 
whose products still carried the mark of inspection. And even if, from 
time to time, a meat processor might be shut or sanctioned, such an en-
forcement action served the larger narrative of systemic effectiveness, 
depicting the sanctioned processor as an aberration—a bad actor evi-
dencing that all other processors played by the rules—and that the public 
was justified in believing that all other meat products were safe to buy 
and eat. 
Consequently, in the decades that followed passage of the FMIA, 
all that industry needed was to keep regulation light enough to not be 
cost prohibitive—which is to say, profit eroding—while at the same time 
keeping the fact of regulation in the public eye to assure that the meat 
being purchased was safe and wholesome. And as to the members of the 
                                                                                                             
Id. (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 9470–72 (1906)). 
 24. 21 U.S.C. § 610(c) (1978) (“No person, firm, or corporation shall . . . sell, transport, offer 
for sale or transportation, or receive for transportation, in commerce, (1) any such articles which (A) 
are capable of use as human food and (B) are adulterated or misbranded[.]”). This provision also 
bars the sale, transport, or offer for sale or transport “any articles required to be inspected under this 
subchapter unless they have been so inspected and passed.” 21 U.S.C. § 610(c)(2) (1978). 
 25. See, e.g., Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co., 249 U.S. 495, 501 (1919) (reversing the grant of 
an injunction and upholding the USDA’s authority under FMIA to prevent the sale of oleomargarine 
using the trade name “Creamo” on the grounds that use of the trade name was misleading and thus 
constituted “misbranding”). 
 26. See, e.g., St. Louis Indep. Packing Co. v. Houston, 215 Fed. 553, 560 (8th Cir. 1914) (hold-
ing that FMIA did not give the USDA authority to withhold the mark of inspection from sausage 
where cereal was in excess of two percent where the name of the product was not false or deceptive, 
and the products were not unsafe, unwholesome, or unfit for human food). Until the major transfor-
mations in meat inspection that started in the wake of the 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli O157:H7 
outbreak, court challenges were not much needed because of the industry’s success in ensuring that 
regulations were largely aligned with industry interests. See Stearns, Preempting Food Safety, supra 
note 17, at 378–79 & nn.17–18 (describing how a “fundamental shift in how [the agency] operated” 
occurred after the outbreak, when USDA “demonstrated a renewed ability to put public interests 
ahead of traditional deference to Meat Industry concerns” and was an example of the agency no 
longer subject to its previous “capture”). 
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public, they were happy to suspend disbelief, so long as challenging or 
otherwise disquieting facts to the contrary were sufficiently kept from 
attention. 
Keeping the safety risks of meat from public attention is not that 
difficult for two main reasons. First, what primarily makes meat unsafe is 
invisible—that is, bacterial pathogens like E. coli, Salmonella, and Cam-
pylobacter.27 But, as the court that rejected an attempt to require warning 
labels on meat explained in defense of the USDA: “[W]e are mindful that 
salmonellae can be detected only by microscopic examination. No one 
contends that Congress meant that inspections should include such exam-
inations.”28 In other words, the USDA was not required to inspect for 
that not visible to the eye, and the public need not be warned about a 
safety risk that it could not see either. The second reason that safety risks 
of meat do not attract attention (in the absence of a revelatory event) is 
because death and illness also remain largely invisible. Only a “small 
proportion of deaths” are linked to reported outbreaks, and unknown 
agents cause at least 81% of illnesses and hospitalizations.29 As such, 
even those sickened or killed by unsafe meat might never know. 
Bad facts do not stay hidden forever, though. And if you look at 
each time that food laws were overhauled, you will always find some 
kind of catastrophe that preceded the overhaul. These preceding catastro-
phes quickly made the suspension of disbelief impossible by coalescing 
the attention of the public and focusing that attention on the need for de-
cisive change. With regard to meat, the catastrophe occurred in 1993 
with the Jack in the Box E. coli O157:H7 outbreak.30 The facts of this 
tragic outbreak, in which hundreds of children fell seriously ill and four 
died, has been recounted at length before, making a full recitation of the 
                                                 
 27. Painter et al., supra note 3, at 409 (finding that of 4,589 outbreaks, 18% of bacterial ill-
nesses were attributable to poultry, and 13% were attributable to beef). 
 28. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n v. Butz, 511 F.2d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming summary 
judgment in favor of USDA in suit alleging violation of Wholesome Meat and Poultry Products 
Acts). 
 29. See Paul Frenzen, Deaths Due to Unknown Agents, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
1536, 1536 (2004) (“[M]ost foodborne outbreaks are never recognized or reported.”); Paul Mead et 
al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 607, 
614 (1999) (reporting that unknown agents account for 81% of foodborne illnesses and hospitaliza-
tions, and 64% of deaths). 
 30. See generally JEFF BENEDICT, POISONED: THE TRUE STORY OF THE DEADLY E. COLI 
OUTBREAK THAT CHANGED THE WAY AMERICANS EAT (2011) (providing a book-length account of 
the outbreak, the litigation arising from it, and the toll that E. coli O157:H7 bacteria took on those 
sickened and killed as a result of contaminated meat). The author of this Article worked as one of the 
lead defense attorneys on behalf of Foodmaker, Inc., the owner and operator of the Jack in the Box 
restaurant chain, and this work is recounted in Benedict’s book. See, e.g., id. at 125–29. 
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details unnecessary here.31 Suffice it to say that one primary effect of this 
outbreak was to make a transformation of meat safety regulation and in-
spection possible in the United States, at last overcoming the resistance 
of both the USDA and the meat industry.32 
In the face of widespread criticism that the manner of meat inspec-
tion had not kept up with either science or reality,33 the USDA did an 
                                                 
 31. See Stearns, Preempting Food Safety, supra note 17, at 389–90 & nn.70–76 (setting forth 
details of the outbreak, including the epidemiological investigation, and the nature and extent of the 
illnesses that comprised the outbreak). 
 32. Id. at 391 & n.77 (“The fact that the Jack in the Box outbreak resulted in relatively prompt 
and significant changes to the federal food safety regulations . . . is widely acknowledged.”). See 
also NESTLE, supra note 10, at 62–85 (describing the twenty years of consistent and often successful 
efforts to block regulations that might adversely affect the meat industry’s commercial interests, the 
denial of responsibility for outbreaks of foodborne illness, and the invocation of science as a means 
to prevent unwanted oversight). This kind of regulatory transformation is not unique to the meat 
industry. For example, long-sought changes to the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, until “headlines 
the nation over broke the news of a mounting death toll” of over one-hundred children killed by a 
liquid form of the sulfa drug “Elixir Sulfanilamide” made with Diethylene glycol, a poisonous sub-
stance that the company had tested for appearance, fragrance, and flavor, but had not tested for safe-
ty. James Harvey Young, The Government and the Consumer: Evolution of Food and Drug Laws, 
The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 13 J. PUB. L. 197, 203 (1964). See also Paul M. Wax, 
M.D., Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 122.6 
ANN. INTERNAL MED. 456, 456–61 (1995) (detailing the Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster of 1937 and 
how FDCA changed FDA from a policing agency primarily concerned with confiscation of adulter-
ated drugs to a regulatory agency overseeing the evaluation and approval of new drugs). The FDA’s 
powers regarding the approval of drugs were increased again in 1962 with the passage of the 
Kefauver–Harris Amendments, which authorized the FDA to require drug companies to conduct and 
submit tests determining safety and efficacy, to pre-clear human trials, drug advertising, and label-
ing, and increased regulatory power over manufacturing. See Jeremy Greene & Scott Podolsky, 
Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals—The Kefauver–Harris Amendments at 50, 367 N. ENGL. 
J. MED. 1481, 1481–83 (2012) (describing how the amendments, among other things, gave FDA 
authority to require proof of efficacy, and not just safety, in the approval of drugs). 
 33. A report issued in 1994, in the wake of the Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak, concluded that 
“FSIS’s meat and poultry inspection system does not efficiently and effectively use its resources to 
protect the public from the most serious health risks associated with meat and poultry-microbial 
contamination.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–94–110, FOOD SAFETY: RISK-
BASED INSPECTIONS AND MICROBIAL MONITORING NEEDED FOR MEAT AND POULTRY 2 (1994), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/219682.pdf. The report then went on to observe and 
explain: 
The system—originally designed around the turn of the century to protect against health 
threats from diseased animals—is hampered by inflexible legal requirements and relies 
on outdated, labor-intensive inspection methods. Under current law, federal inspectors 
must examine each carcass slaughtered—nearly 7 billion birds and livestock annually—
and visit each of the approximately 5,900 processing plants at least once during each op-
erating shift. During these inspections, FSIS inspectors rely on their senses (smell, touch, 
and feel) to make judgments about disease conditions, contamination, and sanitation. 
However, these inspections, which consumed about two-thirds of FSIS’[s] 10,750 staff 
year budget in fiscal year 1993, cannot detect microbial contamination. 
Id. It makes sense, though, that the inspection methods designed in response to revelations in The 
Jungle focused more on the disgusting than dangerous. Id. at 3 (“The Jungle raised a public outcry 
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about-face in its position on whether bacterial pathogens could be regu-
lated as “adulterants” within the meaning of the FMIA.34 Suddenly, in-
stead of siding with the meat industry in its position that the consumer 
was responsible for making meat safe to eat by cooking and handling it 
properly, the USDA decided to recognize the special danger of E. coli 
O157:H7 and declared it a per se adulterant under the FMIA, and thus 
began testing for bacteria in meat processing plants.35 More importantly, 
though, the USDA began to speak out about pathogens—an invisible 
contaminant. Gone was the “poke-and-sniff,” organoleptic approach to 
inspection, which relied on sight and smell as the primary means of as-
suring that only meat of a sufficient quality and safety made it into the 
food supply.36 For the first time, the real safety risks—the invisible safety 
risks that posed the real threat to the public health—would be given at-
tention. 
When accused two decades earlier of misbranding for its placement 
of the mark of inspection on meat contaminated with Salmonella, the 
USDA resisted the effort to directly warn the public with product labels, 
arguing that the public already understood the risk.37 Thus, as a matter of 
regulation, the agency fought to remain silent about the dangers such 
pathogens posed to the public and the agency’s lack of action in prevent-
ing the sale of contaminated meat. It was only when the Jack in the Box 
                                                                                                             
about contagious animal diseases, unsanitary conditions, deceptive practices, and lax government 
inspection at meat packing plants.”). 
 34. The announcement was first made by Michael Taylor at a speech on September 24, 1994 to 
the American Meat Institute (AMI), where he stated: 
To clarify an important legal point, we consider raw ground beef that is contaminated 
with E. coli O157:H7 to be adulterated within the meaning of the [FMIA]. We are pre-
pared to use the Act’s enforcement tools, as necessary, to exclude adulterated product 
from commerce. Finally, we plan to conduct targeted sampling and testing of raw ground 
beef at plants and in the marketplace for possible contamination. 
Michael Taylor, Speech to AMI (Sept. 24, 1994) (copy of speech in author’s possession). 
 35. Tex. Food Indus. Ass’n. v. Espy, 870 F. Supp. 143, 149 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (upholding both 
the declaration of E. coli O157:H7 as an adulterant and the proposed testing program, explaining 
that, “unlike other pathogens, it is not ‘proper’ cooking but ‘thorough’ cooking that is necessary to 
protect consumers from E. coli. . . .Therefore, E. coli is a substance that renders ‘injurious to health’ 
what many Americans believe to be properly cooked ground beef”). 
 36. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 33, at 3. 
 37. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n v. Butz, 511 F.2d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting USDA letter 
stating “the American consumer knows that raw meat and poultry are not sterile and, if handled 
improperly, perhaps could cause illness”). The USDA also argued that a “consumer education pro-
gram”—a kind of indirect warning—was more than sufficient to meet its obligations under the 
FMIA. Id. (“[A] soundly designed consumer education program is the best manner in which to ap-
proach the entire problem of food-borne disease.”). A dissenting judge found it to be a “debatable 
proposition” whether consumers are aware of the risks, noting that the “record contains facts sup-
porting appellants’ assertion that people are not generally aware of the danger of salmonellae, much 
less the safeguards required to avoid salmonellosis.” Id. at 336 (Robinson, III, J., dissenting). 
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outbreak revealed the inadequacies of both the USDA and the industry 
that the public responded with outraged demands for change and a regu-
latory response was made politically possible. 
In the end, though, that regulatory response had but a single pur-
pose: to make people stop talking about unsafe meat and go back to pur-
chasing and consuming meat in great quantities. Neither the agency nor 
the meat industry was focused on a goal of eliminating the risks of path-
ogens in meat; instead, the goal (perhaps unstated) was to reinforce the 
view that a regulatory response—and seemingly stricter enforcement—
had the ability to make meat as safe as the public expected. But this was 
more subterfuge than anything else, as the USDA’s much-touted over-
haul of meat inspection 
ultimately failed to deliver the promised increase in meat safety. . . . 
Instead of improved safety, what was delivered was a further con-
solidation and industrialization of the meat industry, much like what 
followed the passage of the Federal Meat Inspection Act in 1906, 
which was notable for being as much prompted by a public outcry 
as it was for the speed with which industry and government turned 
the Act to interests having little to do with safety.38 
Thus, notwithstanding the supposedly game-changing revelations 
of the Jack in the Box outbreak, consolidation quickly allowed industry 
to reassert its dominance on issues of inspection and enforcement, lead-
ing, among other things, to the USDA allowing large plants to be exempt 
from FSIS testing.39 This exemption was one of the factors identified in 
2002 as causing the second biggest ground beef recall in history—over 
18 million pounds—when forty-six people in sixteen states fell ill with E. 
coli O157:H7 infections, resulting in one death.40 A report by the 
USDA’s inspector general found that “meat inspectors and the company 
largely ignored evidence of E coli O157:H7 contamination that began 
cropping up . . . more than a year before the recall and illness out-
                                                 
 38. Denis Stearns, A Continuing Plague: Faceless Transactions and the Coincident Rise of 
Food Adulteration and Legal Regulation of Quality, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 421, 423 (2014) [hereinafter 
Stearns, A Continuing Plague] (questioning, among other things, why the legal regulation of quality 
is “presumed to be the sole effective response to the problem of food safety, creating a kind of regu-
latory imperative, with each large-scale outbreak giving rise to cries for stricter standards”). 
 39. Robert Roos, FSIS, ConAgra Share Blame for Massive 2002 Beef Recall, U. MINN. CTR. 
FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y (Oct. 3, 2003), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-
perspective/2003/10/fsis-conagra-share-blame-massive-2002-beef-recall (noting that in a policy that 
was discontinued in September 2002, large meat plants “did their own pathogen testing under 
HACCP plans exempt from FSIS testing”). 
 40. Id. (“A report by the [USDA’s] inspector general blames both federal meat inspectors and 
ConAgra Beef Co. for errors that led to a multistate outbreak.”). 
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break[.]”41 According to the report, “FSIS inspectors at ConAgra did not 
perform their own tests and did not review other tests that were available 
to them.”42 
Both regulatory agencies and the food industry respond to food 
safety crises with similar rhetoric touting the ability of quality regula-
tions and inspection regimes to guarantee food safety. Consequently, the 
public is asked to trust that the system will do its job such that there is no 
reason for continuing doubts or fears. Echoing FDR’s admonishment to a 
public caught in the grip of the Great Depression, the message sent is that 
“the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”43 In this way, the public is 
encouraged to return the daily focus to things other than particular fears 
of food safety. But with this returned focus, the problems of food safety 
are not really solved; they are simply hidden again, behind a closed cur-
tain, until the next exposé comes along to remind the public yet again 
that the “great and powerful” agency is rarely, if ever, effective as the 
public would like to believe.44 Meanwhile, so many people continue to 
fall ill and die year after year because of unsafe food, in what I have pre-
viously called “a continuing plague.”45 This plague, though, manages to 
remain a kind of background noise, hidden enough from view to avoid 
being a cause of public outrage and a threat to continued food sales—that 
is, unless people speak up. 
                                                 
 41. Id.; see also Greg Winter, Beef Processor’s Parent No Stranger to Troubles, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 20, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/20/us/beef-processor-s-parent-no-stranger-to-
troubles.html (noting that ConAgra was “hardly at the extreme of the industry. In fact, it is well 
regarded as something of a leader in food safety by public health advocates, who argue that the real 
danger lies in the shortcomings of federal regulation.”). The complete Inspector General’s Report, 
FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE OVERSIGHT OF PRODUCTION PROCESS AND RECALL AT 
CONAGRA PLANT (ESTABLISHMENT 969), can be found at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/24601-
2-KC%20conagra%20091603.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT]. 
 42. INSPECTOR GEN. REPORT, supra note 41, at iii. 
 43. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, VOLUME TWO: THE YEAR OF CRISIS, 1933, at 11–16 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1938). 
 44. See, e.g., Wil S. Hylton, A Bug in the System: Why Last Night’s Chicken Made You Sick, 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 2, 2015, at 30, 32 (“The regulatory function at the F.S.I.S. can seem like a dis-
tant afterthought at the U.S.D.A., whose primary purpose is to advance the interests of American 
agriculture.”). 
 45. Stearns, A Continuing Plague, supra note 38, at 422 (observing that “media focus on issues 
of food and food safety has only increased over time . . . . But still the plague continues with no end 
in sight”). 
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III. THE ORIGINS OF ANTI-DISCOURSE: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
SEEKS TO SILENCE CRITICAL SPEECH AND DISCLOSURE 
For an industry built on marketing, where products seek to outshout 
each other for a claim on public attention, and thus market share, there is 
no shortage of irony in the fact that the food industry has been preemi-
nent in seeking to silence those who attempt to contradict the carefully 
crafted message of food safety. The effort to silence, by way of passing 
food-specific libel laws, first began with what is known as the “Alar 
scare.”46 And, as with all stories, there are many, many sides. As depict-
ed by those seeking to present a morality tale about the stoking of un-
founded paranoia and the horrors of overzealous regulators, namely the 
food industry, the Alar scare presents the story of how apple farmers 
were harmed by the public concern about a pesticide—evidence of why 
laws are needed to protect food producers from allegedly libelous state-
ments that can cause sales to plummet.47 As one commentator explains: 
The so-called Alar scare occurred more than seven years ago, but it 
is still very much in the news—mainly because food and chemical 
industry trade groups have made it their rallying cry as they lobby 
for “agricultural-disparagement” laws meant to blunt criticism of 
their products. The Alar affair also has become a favorite media 
symbol for a false alarm. Reporters and pundits repeatedly refer to it 
as a prime example of Chicken Little environmentalism and gov-
ernment regulation run amok.48 
But for critics of product disparagement statutes, efforts to penalize (and 
even criminalize) critical speech about food safety evidences a food in-
dustry that will do anything to protect consumer confidence in the safety 
                                                 
 46. See generally Margot Fell, Note, Agricultural Disparagement Statutes: Tainted Beef, 
Tainted Speech, and Tainted Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 981, 986–87 
(1999) (briefly summarizing the fallout, litigation-related and otherwise, from the public reaction to 
news that Alar could cause cancer in children, including the fact that “[m]any veggie libel laws were 
passed”). See also David J. Bederman et al., Of Banana Bills and Veggie Hate Crimes: The Constitu-
tionality of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135, 137 (1997) (noting 
disparagement statutes emerged as a response to Alar incident); Howard F. Lyman, Free Speech, 
Animal Law, and Food Activism, 5 ANIMAL L. i, ii–iii (1999) (pointing out that the passage of food 
disparagement laws in thirteen states by 1996 “were a result of the Alar scare,” while also coinciding 
at that time with the unfolding mad cow epidemic). 
 47. Eileen Gay Jones, Forbidden Fruit: Talking About Pesticides and Food Safety in the Era of 
Agricultural Product Disparagement Laws, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 823, 832 (2001) (“Finding that state 
law would not protect them from the fallout from food scares, farmers rallied for a change that 
would be more beneficial to their interests.”). 
 48. Elliot Negin, The Alar “Scare” Was For Real; and So Is That “Veggie Hate-Crime Move-
ment”, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.–Oct. 1996, available at http://www.pbs.org/tradesecrets/ 
docs/alarscarenegin.html. 
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of food, even at the price of suppressing factual information and opinion. 
For these critics, the story of the “Alar scare” is Exhibit A. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it becomes easy to see how the reve-
lation of Alar on apples was the source of controversy. It is also easy to 
see the beginning of a pattern (one that was to repeat in the two decades 
that followed), which goes as follows. First, there is a link provided by 
scientific research between a health risk and a food product. Second, 
there is an increase in regulatory attention to the risk, often accompanied 
by some public statement admitting that the agency is looking further 
into the matter but taking no immediate action, usually because of indus-
try pressure. Third, there is an increase in media attention, culminating in 
the publication of a news story that gains widespread attention. Fourth, 
as a result of the attention that was prompted by the news story, public 
concern grows and coalesces, leading to a fall in sales of the food prod-
uct. Finally, as a result of the fall in sales, the industry segment that was 
harmed fights back, usually on multiple fronts, using not only a public 
relations strategy, but also seeking regulatory intervention of some kind, 
and sometimes filing a lawsuit. And it was in precisely this way that the 
Alar scare played out. 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss and a motion to remand, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington set the factu-
al stage for the Alar lawsuit in a way that follows the pattern just de-
scribed: 
On February 26, 1989 the CBS television program “60 Minutes” 
aired a segment highly critical of daminozide, more commonly 
known by its tradename as Alar. Alar was commonly used in the 
apple industry as a growth regulator. By maintaining the fruit on the 
tree longer, cosmetic appearance is improved, fruit disorders are re-
duced, size is increased and storage life is enhanced. Various public 
interest groups, among them the Natural Resources Defense Council 
[NRDC], expressed concern over research which indicated that Alar 
chemically degrades into unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine 
[UDMH], a carcinogen. Alar cannot be washed off the fruit, nor 
will peeling remove it. The substance remains in the flesh of the ap-
ple regardless of processing procedures. 
The risk falls hardest on children who are the largest consumers of 
apple products. Based on these findings, the maxim “an apple a day 
keeps the doctor away” lost its appeal in the eyes of NRDC. “60 
Minutes” investigated a report published by NRDC and centered a 
broadcast around those concerns narrated by Ed Bradley. The credi-
bility of the report was bolstered by an interview with the acting di-
rector of the Environmental Protection Agency, Dr. Moore. While 
minimizing the severity of risk, Dr. Moore confirmed that Alar was 
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indeed a health hazard and noted that under today’s rigorous certifi-
cation standards, the chemical would not be approved for use.49 
The litigation arising from the so-called Alar scare was filed as a 
class action, with eleven Washington State apple growers acting as rep-
resentatives for approximately 4,700 growers.50 Those who sued sought 
compensation for the economic injury alleged to have been caused by the 
airing of the program. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “Following 
the ‘60 Minutes’ broadcast, consumer demand for apples and apple 
products decreased dramatically. The apple growers and others depend-
ent upon apple production lost millions of dollars. Many of the growers 
lost their homes and livelihoods.”51 
After the initial effort to get the motions dismissed failed, discovery 
on the question of the falsity of the broadcast proceeded, followed by 
CBS’s motion for summary judgment on this same question.52 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment, emphasizing that “the issue of the 
carcinogenic effect of pesticides in the food supply is speech that clearly 
matters.”53 The court further held: 
Even if CBS’ statements are false, they were about an issue that 
mattered, cannot be proven as false and therefore must be protected. 
To hold as plaintiffs request would have required CBS to take the 
EPA report and perform a highly technical scientific study before 
issuing a public broadcast about that report. A news reporting ser-
vice is not a scientific testing lab and these services should be able 
to rely on a scientific government report when they are relaying the 
report’s results. The duty plaintiffs propose would so chill debate 
that the freedom of speech would be at risk.54 
In affirming dismissal, the Ninth Circuit made brief work of the 
plaintiffs’ arguments, noting first the applicable legal standard: 
To establish a claim of product disparagement, also known as trade 
libel, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant published a knowing-
                                                 
 49. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 800 F. Supp. 928, 930 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (denying motions to 
dismiss and remand of CBS “60 Minutes,” while granting summary judgment dismissal of non-
diverse CBS affiliate stations) (footnote omitted). 
 50. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 51. Id.; see also Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 930–31 (“[P]ublic reaction to the broadcast was dra-
matic and swift. Both sales and prices fell sharply, not only locally, but world-wide. . . . [G]rowers 
and others dependent upon apple production sustained tremendous losses amounting to perhaps as 
much as $75 million dollars.”). 
 52. Auvil, 800 F.3d at 819; Auvil, 836 F. Supp. at 741–42 (“CBS claims that it is entitled to 
summary judgment because the plaintiffs cannot prove that CBS’ statements were false.”). 
 53. Auvil, 836 F. Supp. at 743. 
 54. Id. 
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ly false statement harmful to the interests of another and intended 
such publication to harm the plaintiff’s pecuniary interests. Accord-
ingly, for a product disparagement claim to be actionable, the plain-
tiff must prove, inter alia, the falsity of the disparaging state-
ments.55 
Applying these standards, the court rejected all arguments that the state-
ments made in the broadcast were false. For example, the court disagreed 
that the lack of human studies was enough to create issues of fact for trial 
given the existence of “[a]nimal laboratory tests [that] are a legitimate 
means for assessing cancer risks to humans.”56 The court also refused to 
recognize as valid a defamation theory based on the possibility that “a 
jury could find that the broadcast contained a provably false message, 
viewing the broadcast segment in its entirety.”57 According to the court, 
“No Washington court has held that the analysis of falsity proceeds from 
an implied, disparaging message. It is the statements themselves that are 
of primary concern in the analysis.”58 Of particular note, the court em-
phasized that “using irony and innuendo” was not enough because de-
famatory meaning may not be imputed to true statements.”59 
Summing up its ruling, the Ninth Circuit sounds a cautionary note 
that, in retrospect, is what spurred subsequent industry efforts to statuto-
rily enact a lower burden of proof for product disparagement. Specifical-
ly, the court warned: 
[I]f we were to accept the growers’ argument, plaintiffs bringing 
suit based on disparaging speech would escape summary judgment 
merely by arguing, as the growers have, that a jury should be al-
lowed to determine both the overall message of a broadcast and 
whether that overall message is false. Because a broadcast could be 
interpreted in numerous, nuanced ways, a great deal of uncertainty 
would arise as to the message conveyed by the broadcast. Such un-
certainty would make it difficult for broadcasters to predict whether 
their work would subject them to tort liability. Furthermore, such 
uncertainty raises the spectre of a chilling effect on speech.60 
                                                 
 55. Auvil, 67 F.3d at 820 (citation omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 623A, 651(1)(c)). 
 56. Id. at 821. 
 57. Id. at 822 (emphasis in original). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (quoting Lee v. Columbian, Inc., 826 P.2d 217, 219 (1991)). 
 60. Id. In a footnote, the Auvil court considerably expanded on its concerns with the plaintiffs’ 
proffered approach to basing claims of defamation on the overall message of a broadcast. The court 
writes: 
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The plaintiffs plainly felt entitled to this lower burden of proof, one 
that would allow them to point to disparaging “innuendo and irony” and 
the falsity of what is alleged to be the “overall message” in seeking dam-
ages for product disparagement.61 The apple growers were aggrieved by 
the public response, which was thought to be an overreaction against the 
carcinogenic properties of a pesticide that had long been in use and was 
allowed by the EPA.62 And it was this sense of grievance that inspired an 
increased push in favor of enacting agricultural disparagement statutes 
that would allow claims of defamation to rest not only on what was false-
ly said, but also on what was falsely implied.63 
Thirteen states (not including Washington State) currently have 
disparagement statutes, although not all are the same.64 Colorado is the 
only state to have criminalized disparagement.65 Of the twelve states with 
                                                                                                             
There is an additional problem with the growers’ arguments: their approach allows dis-
paragement plaintiffs to construct an overall message that lends itself easily to proof of 
falsity. The instant case provides a cogent example. Rather than proving the falsity of 
statements made during “ ‘A’ is for Apple” by challenging the studies upon which factual 
assertions made during the broadcast were based, the growers request that we analyze the 
message that the studies conclusively show that apples cause cancer in humans. Accord-
ingly, the growers offered evidence that the studies are not conclusive, that there are no 
studies tracing the specific link between ingestion of daminozide and incidence of cancer 
in humans. It is considerably easier to prove the falsity of an assertion that studies are 
conclusive, rather than to prove the falsity of the studies themselves. 
Id. at 822 n.11. 
 61. Id. at 822. 
 62. Negin, supra note 48, at 13 (stating that although there was “indeed an overreaction to the 
60 Minutes report, as viewers confused a long-term cumulative threat with imminent danger” the 
EPA’s review of scientific data confirmed the long-term dangers posed by Alar, leading to the 
Agency’s decision to ban the use of the pesticide because “long-term exposure to Alar poses unac-
ceptable risks to public health”). 
 63. Rita Marie Cain, Food, Inglorious Food: Food Safety, Food Libel, and Free Speech, 49 
AM. BUS. L.J. 275, 289 (2012) (noting that “[t]he standard in these ‘implied’ falsity statutes seem-
ingly would allow an argument like the Alar plaintiffs’ to proceed to a jury” and “also could cover 
speech that does not specifically criticize the safety of a plaintiff’s product, but could be interpreted 
as such by hearers”). 
 64. Id. at 275 (noting that the risk of being sued for criticizing the food industry “stems from 
special legislation in thirteen U.S. states that protects agriculture and food production interests from 
criticism”). For a chart that helpfully summarizes the provisions of food disparagement statutes, see 
Appendix B, id. at 323. See also Jones, supra note 47, at 823–24 (“Thirteen states have actually 
passed a bill, making a new cause of action for publicizing false information about food safety or 
quality.”); David J. Bederman, Limitations on Commercial Speech: The Evolution of Agricultural 
Disparagement Statutes, 10 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 191, 195 (1998) (“The stated legislative purpose of 
the disparagement statutes is virtually identical in all thirteen states. The language used reflects a 
general concern on the part of each legislature to protect the agricultural and aquacultural economy 
of its state.”). 
 65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 35-31-101 (1994) (making it unlawful to “knowingly . . . make any 
materially false statement . . . for the purpose of in any manner restraining trade, any fruits, vegeta-
bles, grain, meats, or other articles or products ordinarily grown, raised, produced, or used in any 
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civil disparagement laws, eleven limit potential liability to disparagement 
(or libel) of “perishable” products.66 In addition, the allegedly false 
statements must usually be about the food product being in some way 
unsafe.67 But regardless of the variations between the state laws, all stand 
as a means for food producers to both exact compensation for economic 
injury caused by disparagement and deter such criticism from being 
made at all. Such deterrence acts as a proactive silencing of dissent, dis-
sent that might foment doubt about the notion that food is as safe as the 
public expects or assumes. 
The apple growers did not have the benefit of statutory protections 
when they had been unsuccessful in their effort to win compensation for 
the economic injury caused by the 60 Minutes broadcast about the cancer 
risks associated with Alar.68 In contrast, when the next notable food dis-
paragement lawsuit was filed, Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, the com-
plaint alleged violations of the Texas False Disparagement of Food 
Products Act (Texas Food Disparagement Act).69 The lawsuit was high-
profile due to the fact that Oprah Winfrey was among the three defend-
ants.70 In addition to alleging violation of the Texas Food Disparagement 
                                                                                                             
manner or to any extent as food for human beings or for domestic animal”). But see Cain, supra note 
63, at 276 n.7 (“As a criminal law, the Colorado law differs in numerous respects from the other 
twelve state laws. It targets restraints on trade and does not seem to be motivated to protect agribusi-
ness from criticism, as the other states’ statements of legislative purposes reveal.”). 
 66. Cain, supra note 63, at 287 nn.74–76 (citing examples of various statutory definitions of 
“perishable”). North Dakota is the only state with a disparagement law that applies to “any agricul-
tural producer or agricultural product.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-02 (2008). North Dakota is also 
the only state to omit the requirement that false statements must implicate or reference food safety. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-44-01 to -04 (2008). See also Cain, supra note 63, at 288 (arguing that North 
Dakota’s law seems to permit plaintiffs to sue based on “statements about food production tech-
niques, such as use of pesticides on crops or antibiotics and hormones in animals[,] . . . [or] presum-
ably . . . from allegedly false statements about animal welfare”). 
 67. See Fell, supra note 46, at 984 (noting that the intention of the food disparagement laws is 
to ensure that food producers “have a means of protecting themselves against false or misleading 
reports about the safety of the food they produce”). See also Cain, supra note 63, at 287 (“In most 
states, the alleged falsity must be about the lack of safety of a food product.”); Megan W. Semple, 
Veggie-Libel Meets Free Speech: A Constitutional Analysis of Agricultural Disparagement Laws, 15 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 403, 413 (1996). 
 68. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying Washington State 
common law, which had adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A, to determine the 
validity of the asserted product disparagement claim). Although bills were introduced in Washington 
in both the House and Senate in 1992, neither was given a vote. See S.B. 6352, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Wash. 1992); H.B. 2858, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1992). 
 69. Fell, supra note 46, at 982 n.5 (citing and quoting text of the Texas Food Disparagement 
Act). 
 70. See Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 1998). The two other de-
fendants were Harpo Production, Inc., Oprah’s production company, and Howard Lyman, “a former 
cattle-rancher-turned-vegetarian who [was] Executive Director of the Humane Society’s Eating With 
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Act, the lawsuit also asserted claims for common law business dispar-
agement, common law defamation, negligence, and negligence per se.71 
As with the Alar scare incident, this lawsuit was prompted by the broad-
cast of a show discussing potential dangers linked to food. In this case, it 
was Oprah Winfrey’s discussion of “Mad Cow Disease,” relating it in 
part to feeding practices then common in the beef industry.72 
Reportedly, “Paul Engler, owner of one of the largest cattle-feeding 
operations in the country, was so incensed by the program that he [decid-
ed to sue].”73 The plaintiffs alleged that the “Dangerous Foods” episode 
had cost them millions of dollars “as a direct result of the anti-beef sen-
timent of the broadcast,” causing an “Oprah crash” to occur right after 
the program aired.74 
Like claims asserted by the apple growers, the disparagement and 
defamation claims the cattle industry asserted did not lead to the desired 
award of damages.75 After the defense verdict on the sole claim that had 
gone to the jury was announced (business disparagement), Oprah pre-
dictably took to the courthouse steps to make a public statement, ex-
claiming, “Free speech not only lives. It rocks!”76 She was also quoted as 
saying: 
                                                                                                             
Conscience campaign.” Id. at 861. See also Lyman, supra note 46, at i–ii (describing his journey 
going from being a rancher to activist). For a balanced description of the claims, defenses, trial, and 
court rulings, see Marvin L. Hayenga, Texas Cattle Feeders v. Oprah Winfrey: The First Major Test 
of the Veggie Libel Law, CHOICES, 2nd Quarter 1998, at 13–20. 
 71. Tex. Beef Grp., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 860. For a more detailed discussion of claims, which also 
quotes further from the Amended Complaint, see Fell, supra note 46, at 1011. 
 72. Lyman, supra note 46, at iii–iv n.2 (providing a first-hand account by a guest of the show 
and one of the defendants). The segment was called “Dangerous Foods” and it aired on April 16, 
1996. Fell, supra note 46, at 981 (“Ms. Winfrey and her guests discussed the possibility of mad cow 
disease developing in the United States.” (citing Amended Complaint, § III, No. Civ. A.2:96-CV-
208-J)). 
 73. Fell, supra note 46, at 981. 
 74. Id. at 1010. In its decision on appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that the depression in prices 
“continued for approximately eleven weeks” and “reverberated” in other cattle markets as well. Tex. 
Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 684 (5th Cir. 2000). But see Schupp et al., supra note 5, at 28 
(“While the Texas cattlemen may have feared that the statements made by Oprah regarding beef 
consumption caused beef cattle prices to decline, the results of this survey indicated only a minor 
proportion of consumers used her statements as an excuse for reducing beef consumption.”). 
 75. Tex. Beef Grp., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 864 (granting defendants’ motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law made at close of the plaintiffs’ case on statutory disparagement, defamation, and negli-
gence claims). After presenting a defense to the business disparagement claim, the sole claim that 
the court did not dismiss, the jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants, finding no liability for 
disparagement of cattle. Id.; see also Fell, supra note 46, at 1014–17 (discussing the trial court’s 
rulings). 
 76. Fell, supra note 46, at 1016–17 (quoting Jury Decides in Favor of TV Star Winfrey in Suit 
by Cattlemen, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1998, at B19). 
1420 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1399 
I will continue to use my voice. I believed from the beginning that 
(the lawsuit) was an attempt to muzzle my voice, and I come from a 
people who have struggled and died in order to have a voice in this 
country. And I refused to be muzzled. . . . (The lawsuit) will not 
change the way I operate. It has made me even more fervent in my 
desire and intention to bring information and enlightenment and en-
courage people in ways that I see fit.77 
Predictably, the plaintiffs saw the verdict differently, admitting to 
being disappointed but nonetheless claiming, “[W]e do believe that we 
made one very strong point . . . that U.S. beef is safe.”78 But the point 
that Engler and the other plaintiffs from the Texas cattle industry ulti-
mately failed to make, even on appeal, is that Oprah and her guest, How-
ard Lyman (an animal rights activist),79 made false statements. Even a 
publication friendly to the interests of cattle ranchers observed, com-
menting on the trial verdict and likely appeal, “[T]he ability to speak 
freely about concerns or issues regarding the safety of our food supply is 
very important, and many would be reluctant to see that freedom 
abridged because of such concerns.”80 As the Fifth Circuit later explained 
in affirming the judgment as a matter of law on the statutory-based 
claims: 
There is little doubt that Howard Lyman and the Winfrey show em-
ployees melodramatized the “Mad Cow Disease” scare and discus-
sion of the question “Can it happen here?” Perhaps most important, 
from the audience’s viewpoint, was not the give-and-take between 
the glib Lyman and the dry Drs. Weber and Hueston, but Ms. Win-
frey’s exclamation that she was “stopped cold from eating another 
burger.” When Ms. Winfrey speaks, America listens. But her state-
ment is neither actionable nor claimed to be so. Instead, two false 
statements by Lyman and misleading editing are relied upon to car-
ry the cattlemen’s difficult burden. Like the district court, we hold 
they have not sustained their burden of articulating a genuine issue 
of material fact concerning liability under the Act.81 
                                                 
 77. Oprah: “Free Speech Rocks”: Texas Cattlemen Lose Defamation Suit, CNN (Feb. 26, 
1998), http://www.cnn.com/US/9802/26/oprah.verdict/. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Lyman, supra note 46, at i–ii (describing his personal journey from being “a fourth genera-
tion farmer-rancher-feedlot owner” to being a meat safety lobbyist and activist who ended up work-
ing as a director of the Humane Society of the United States’ Eating with Conscience campaign). 
 80. Hayenga, supra note 70, at 20. 
 81. Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 688 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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In so holding, the court avoided the need to make a ruling on the proper 
scope of the Texas Food Disparagement Act, relying on the insufficiency 
of the evidence to affirm dismissal of the claim.82 
Because the cattle industry failed to prove disparagement under ei-
ther the Texas Act or the common law, no new food disparagement laws 
have been enacted. That does not mean food industry efforts to create 
laws against critical speech and disclosure have ceased. Instead, the fo-
cus has changed. Specifically, the agriculture industry has begun to push 
for passage of anti-whistleblower laws, also called “ag-gag” laws.83 This 
push has been in response to a spate of incidents in which videos of 
alarming, often unlawful practices are surreptitiously taped and then re-
leased to the media.84 For example, when the videos of workers at a poul-
try farm revealed vicious cruelty to chickens, the resulting public uproar 
prompted McDonalds and Target to announce that they were no longer 
buying eggs from one of the country’s largest egg producers, Sparboe 
Farms.85 The FDA then followed up by issuing the producer a company-
wide warning letter that “cit[ed] ‘serious’ and ‘significant violations’ at 
five different locations” and “at least 13 violations of the recently enact-
ed federal egg rule meant to prevent dangerous salmonella outbreaks.”86 
Largely in response to these undercover investigations, many done 
by persons who sought to be hired so that the videotapes could be made, 
three states have passed laws that limit (or attempt to limit) the ability to 
conduct such investigations. Specifically, Iowa, Utah, and Idaho have 
passed ag-gag laws.87 The crux of the Iowa law makes it a crime to apply 
for employment at a facility “with an intent to commit an act not author-
ized by the owner of the agriculture production facility, knowing that the 
                                                 
 82. Id. at 689; but see id. at 690 (“I have become convinced that the district court’s interpreta-
tion of the Act was wrong.”) (Jones, E., concurring). 
 83. See Larissa Wilson, Ag-Gag Laws: A Shift in the Wrong Direction for Animal Welfare on 
Farms, 44 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2014). 
 84. Id. at 316 (“Undercover investigations have caused damage to the animal agriculture indus-
try, leading to food recalls and revocation of contracts between meat suppliers and purchasers.”) 
(citing examples); see also Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud and First Amendment Protections of False 
Speech: How United States v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 566, 567–68 (2014) (“These investigations have revealed major violations of food 
safety and humane farming practices, and have prompted action by both the [USDA] and by compa-
nies that purchase products from the facilities investigated.”). 
 85. See Cynthia Galli et al., McDonald’s, Target Dump Egg Supplier After Investigation, ABC 
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/mcdonalds-dumps-mcmuffin-egg-factory-
health-concerns/story?id=14976054. 
 86. Id. 
 87. IOWA CODE § 717A.3A(1)(b) (2013); UTAH CODE § 76-6-112(2)(c) (2013); IDAHO CODE 
§ 18-7042(1)(c)-(d) (2014). See also Liebmann, supra note 84, at 568–70 (discussing and comparing 
the Iowa and Utah laws); Wilson, supra note 83, at 316–17 (discussing passage of Idaho law). 
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act is not authorized.”88 The Utah law is more specific because it applies 
to the acts of obtaining employment to record images or sound if it is 
known that the facility owner prohibits such conduct.89 Along these same 
lines, the Idaho law prohibits someone from obtaining employment “by 
force, threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or 
other injury,”90 while also prohibiting anyone from entering without con-
sent to make audio or video recordings.91 Although no other states have 
yet passed similar laws, a number of states are actively considering such 
laws.92 
The irony of ag-gag (or anti-whistleblower) laws is that they are 
premised on a kind of privacy right for the food producer. Despite the 
fact of federal inspection, either ongoing in the case of USDA, or the 
right of inspection in the case of FDA, agribusiness claims for itself the 
right to bar the public from seeing what occurs inside its facility, even 
though the public is expected to eat the food that is made there. In short, 
the food industry wants the public to eat the food made behind the cur-
tain, but never see the food being made. And thus any act of revelation—
of pulling the curtain aside—is an invasion to be criminalized in the view 
of the food industry. 
Similar to disparagement statutes that attempt to silence critical dis-
course about food safety concerns, ag-gag laws seek to suppress the dis-
tribution of information that might otherwise inform decisions about 
whether to purchase a given product. When videos of something that ac-
tually took place are released to the media, it is the apparent truth that is 
revealed, and nothing else, which is what gives the revelation such po-
tential impact. On the other hand, even if a photograph unquestionably 
reveals that which was photographed, the lack of context can leave a 
viewer at a loss in understanding the significance of what is viewed.93 
                                                 
 88. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(b) (2013). 
 89. UTAH CODE § 76-6-112(2)(c) (2013). 
 90. IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1)(d) (2014). 
 91. IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1)(c)–(d) (2014). 
 92. See Wilson, supra note 83, at 318 & n.49 (“[S]everal new ag-gag bills in other states are 
being considered.”); Liebmann, supra note 84, at 570 (“In 2013, Ag-Gag bills were proposed in 
eleven other states.”). 
 93. For example, a recent article discussing undercover video that is alleged to have revealed 
inhumane practices at a chicken farm that had been “certified humane” notes that “experts debated 
exactly what was wrong with the hens shown in the video. Is the forlorn-looking, nearly bald hen a 
victim of feather pecking, a behavioral tic acquired by chickens in close quarters? Or is the hen 
simply molting?” Stephanie Strom & Sabrina Tavernise, Animal Rights Group’s Video of Hens 
Raises Questions, but Not Just for Farms, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/business/direct-action-everywhere-video-of-laying-hens-raises-
concerns.html?_r=0. 
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Either way, when people, experts or otherwise, speak of fears about food, 
questioning the practices or the intentions of food producers and regula-
tors alike, they are calling into question a central premise of the food 
supply in the United States, a premise that both food producers and regu-
lators do not want called into question—trust. Except for food that I 
grow myself, and prepare myself, I am forced to trust that the food I eat 
was prepared under conditions that are acceptably safe, and preferably 
neither disgusting nor morally questionable. But the simple fact is that 
much food in the United States is not as safe as it could be and not pre-
pared under conditions that the public imagines. There is, as a result, a 
significant disconnect between the reality of food production in the Unit-
ed States and what the public both wants and believes. But here, the pub-
lic’s want is the mother of its belief, filling the disconnect with magical 
thinking that government and industry can exploit to maintain public 
confidence. So long as the levels of safety can be maintained at accepta-
ble levels—low enough to avoid stoking fear, but not high enough to 
threaten profits—the public will continue to trust the safety of the U.S. 
food supply. That is, however, until the next disturbing revelation comes 
along. The story of lean finely textured beef is a perfect case in point be-
cause it is an ingredient that managed to remain “hidden” in ground beef 
products for twenty years until being given the revelatory name of “pink 
slime,” creating a public backlash that quickly threatened trust in the 
product and its sales. 
IV. AN AGENCY COMPLICIT IN PUBLIC DECEPTIONS: HOW “PINK SLIME” 
CAME TO BE ADDED TO GROUND BEEF 
Two things must be said at the outset. First, and at the risk of ap-
pearing defensive, let it be known that the “proper” (or, according to its 
defenders, nonpejorative) name for what ultimately came to be called 
“pink slime” is “lean finely textured beef” (LFTB).94 “LFTB is a beef 
product developed by Beef Products, Inc. (BPI), in 1991 to provide more 
domestic lean beef.”95 It is made from “fat trimmings that otherwise have 
                                                 
 94. The name “pink slime” was coined by Gerald Zirnstein, then a USDA-FSIS employee, and 
subsequently a defendant in BPI’s lawsuit. USDA/ERS, Consumer Concern About LFTB and Its 
Effect on Ground Beef Prices, DROVERS CATTLE NETWORK (Aug. 16, 2012, 4:12 PM), 
http://www.cattlenetwork.com/cattle-news/Consumer-concern-about-LFTB-and-its-effects-on-
ground-beef-prices-166453526.html. He additionally “comment[ed] that 70 percent of the ground 
beef sold in supermarkets contained LFTB.” Id. 
 95. JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42473, LEAN FINELY TEXTURED BEEF: THE 
“PINK SLIME” CONTROVERSY 2 (2012), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42473.pdf. 
Cargill is the manufacturer of a similar product called finely texturized beef or FTB. USDA/ERS, 
supra note 94. See also J. Ross Pruitt & David P. Anderson, Assessing the Impact of LFTB in the 
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less value [than other parts of the carcass] and typically sell at a discount 
to a rendering plant.”96 To make LFTB, the trimmings are heated just-to-
melting and sent through a centrifuge that separates what meat remains 
from the fat.97 According to information on the BPI website, the result is 
a product that is “typically 94% to 97% lean and is a key ingredient to 
making low fat ground beef or any other food in which lean finely tex-
tured beef is an essential ingredient.”98 Not touted on the website is the 
fact that “[d]uring the production process, BPI treats the LFTB with 
food-grade ammonia gas; the gas mixes with the water in the meat and 
creates ammonium hydroxide, which in turn raises the pH level in the 
LFTB and kills pathogens.”99 
Second, and at the risk of sounding like a broken record, the facts 
require it be said at the outset that the “pink slime” controversy (as the 
Congressional Research Service, among others, have called it) was trig-
gered by a broadcast news report. Specifically: 
                                                                                                             
Beef Cattle Industry, CHOICES MAG. ONLINE, http://www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-
magazine/theme-articles/pink-slimemarketing-uncertainty-and-risk-in-the-24-hour-news-
cycle/assessing-the-impact-of-lftb-in-the-beef-cattle-industry (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) (noting 
various kinds of LFTB have been used since “early 1980’s,” but the version subject to controversy 
since 2001). 
 96. USDA/ERS, supra note 94. On average, this fatty trim makes up approximately five to ten 
percent of the total weight of a carcass, and its sale for use in making LFTB “adds value to the car-
cass by utilizing a few more pounds of beef that would otherwise be used in rendering.” Id. When 
the market for LFTB declined as a result of the “pink slime” controversy, it was estimated that an 
additional 900 million pounds of extra fat trimmings would be available for sale, presumably, again, 
for rendering. Id. See also Pruitt & Anderson, supra note 95 (observing that, unless the fat trimmings 
were used in making LFTB, the fat trimmings “would have been rendered down or . . . been incorpo-
rated into lower value products”). 
 97. GREENE, supra note 95, at 2. See also Y. He & J.G. Sebranek, Functional Protein Compo-
nents in Lean Finely Textured Tissue from Beef and Pork, 61 J. FOOD SCI. 1155, 1155 (1996) (de-
scribing that lean finely textured tissue, which includes LFTB, “is derived from beef and pork . . . by 
unique low-temperature separation process”). 
 98. BPI Lean Finely Textured Beef—Why It’s Good, BEEF PRODUCTS, INC., 
http://www.beefproducts.com/why_its_good.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
 99. GREENE, supra note 95, at 2 (citing multiple sources). Kit Foshee, a former BPI employee, 
and one of the defendants that BPI would later sue for product disparagement and defamation, 
claimed in emails to the USDA that BPI submitted false test results to the USDA to obtain approval 
for the ammonia-injected product, and that the process did not achieve the pathogen reduction 
claimed. Foshee also claimed that pH levels were not raised to the levels needed, or those used in 
tests, because of the effect on taste and smell of the LFTB. Consequently, according to Foshee, 
LFTB was not as safe as BPI claimed. See also Michael Moss, Safety of Beef Processing Method Is 
Questioned, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/us/31meat.html 
(noting in 2009 article that BPI “acknowledged lowering the alkalinity, and the U.S.D.A. said it had 
determined that ‘at least some of B.P.I.’s product was no longer receiving the full lethality treat-
ment’”). 
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Although LFTB had received negative press in previous years, the 
issue re-emerged dramatically on March 7, 2012, when ABC News 
broadcast a report about the use of LFTB in retail beef products. 
The report referred to LFTB as “pink slime,” and described LFTB 
as “beef trimmings that were once used only in dog food and cook-
ing oil, but now [are] sprayed with ammonia to make them safe to 
eat.”100 
Subsequent media coverage seemed only to increase public outrage and 
renewed attention to USDA e-mails the New York Times had published 
in 2009—e-mails that had revealed agency insiders were concerned 
about the quality of this meat product and the safety of the processes 
used to make it.101 Yet, interestingly, while the New York Times article 
directly questioned the safety of LFTB and the validity of the research 
studies that BPI submitted to the USDA to get its production process ap-
proved,102 BPI never accused the article’s author of product disparage-
ment. 
But such concerns over bad publicity never managed to stand in the 
way of the meat industry’s desire to continue selling a profitable product. 
Moreover, even though the New York Times article prompted both a fo-
cus on the use of LFTB and some measure of public reaction, the loss of 
market share was not dramatic at first. Fast food chains, including 
McDonald’s, Burger King, and Taco Bell, were the first to stop using the 
product.103 And the companies appeared careful not to blame the product 
itself, or admit that consumer concerns were the reason for no longer us-
ing LFTB, stating, for example, “[T]he decision to remove BPI products 
from McDonald’s system was not related to any particular event but ra-
ther to align our global beef raw material standards.”104 
                                                 
 100. GREENE, supra note 95, at 5 (alteration in original). 
 101. Id. (stating how “in an internal email, which became public as part of a New York Times 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, one of the USDA employees had called LFTB ‘pink 
slime,’ and characterized as ‘fraudulent labeling’ the labeling of ground beef blended with LFTB as 
‘ground beef’”). Although many of the emails are subject to a protective order, those that can be 
obtained from USDA by FOIA requests are not. For the New York Times article in question, see 
Moss, supra note 99. 
 102. Moss, supra note 99 (reporting that E. coli and Salmonella had on many occasions been 
found in BPI meat sold in the school lunch program, prompting the USDA to revoke its exemption 
against testing for pathogens—an exemption that had been based on the asserted efficacy of BPI’s 
ammonia kill-step process). 
 103. GREENE, supra note 95, at 5–6. 
 104. Id. at 6 (quoting Helena Bottemiller, Fast Food Companies Abandon Ammoniated Beef, 
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/01/fast-food-companies-
abandon-ammoniated-beef)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that Burger King issued a 
“similar statement”). 
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What seemed to change the tenor of public reaction from one of 
concern to fear and outrage was the renewed focus on the use of ammo-
nia as a “kill-step” in the manufacture of LFTB. The use of ammonia is 
necessary because LFTB is made of materials—trimmings—more likely 
to contain E. coli and Salmonella, “which are more prevalent in fatty 
trimmings than in higher grades of beef.”105 According to the report pre-
pared by the Congressional Research Service: 
Two days before the ABC News report, The Daily, an online news 
publication, reported that USDA was buying 7 million pounds of 
LFTB for the school lunch program. The report also referenced a 
video from celebrity chef Jamie Oliver’s Food Revolution television 
show from April 2011 that shows beef trimmings, characterized as 
inedible, being mixed with what appears to be household cleaning 
ammonia to simulate the process for making LFTB.106 
In response to the growing concern about the safety of LFTB (be-
cause of the need for ammonia as a processing step), combined with the 
previous decisions of fast food chains to stop using it, the USDA decided 
that it would “give school districts the option to buy ground beef without 
LFTB.”107 The fallout from this decision was swift.108 Major grocery 
store chains quickly announced that they would no longer sell ground 
beef that contained LFTB.109 The makers of LFTB then decided to re-
duce production, market prices for beef declined, and companies decided 
to begin voluntarily labeling ground beef containing LFTB.110 “In state-
ments released to the press, the grocery stores that stopped carrying 
ground beef with LFTB stated that it was safe, but that their customers 
were demanding that it not be used in ground beef.”111 
With demand for LFTB disappearing amid concerns about the safe-
ty of the product, and the fact that most consumers seemed to think that it 
                                                 
 105. Moss, supra note 99 (noting that according to a study funded by BPI, “the trimmings 
‘typically include[] most of the material from the outer surfaces of the carcass’ and contain ‘larger 
microbiological populations’”). 
 106. GREENE, supra note 95, at 5. BPI had developed the process that used anhydrous ammo-
nia as intervention to reduce the presence of E. coli O157:H7 to undetectable levels, as required by 
USDA regulations. The process was also shown to be effective on Salmonella. Id. at 2. The extent of 
the effectiveness of the intervention was, however, a subject of dispute within the USDA, a dispute 
that prompted some of the criticisms of the product’s safety—criticisms that BPI would later allege 
to be defamatory. 
 107. GREENE, supra note 95, at 6. 
 108. USDA/ERS, supra note 95, at 6 (“Demand for LFTB recently declined following media 
reports portraying it as a seemingly unappealing additive to ground beef products.”). 
 109. GREENE, supra note 96, at 7 (citing multiple sources). 
 110. Id. at 6. 
 111. Id. at 7. 
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in fact looked like “pink slime” and was, as a result, disgusting, BPI de-
cided to sue. In doing so, BPI and its attorneys went to great length in the 
complaint to depict the public’s reaction as solely the result of a “disin-
formation campaign against BPI and LFTB.”112 As alleged by BPI, the 
public reaction was solely based on the “disinformation campaign” be-
cause 
Defendants’ disinformation campaign had its intended effect—
consumers reacted negatively to LFTB and demanded that grocery 
stores stop selling ground beef made with “pink slime.” This reac-
tion was not based on accurate information about LFTB but on dis-
information spread by Defendants. Defendants led consumers to be-
lieve that LFTB was not beef, was not safe or healthy, and was ap-
proved by the USDA only because BPI had engaged in improper 
conduct.113 
These were allegations of product disparagement taken to a whole new 
level. BPI was accusing ABC of not just getting their facts wrong, but of 
an intentional and successful attempt to deceive the public.114 
V. THE “PINK SLIME” LAWSUIT: TRYING TO ACCUSE THE MEDIA OF 
BEING THAT MAN BEHIND THE CURTAIN 
BPI commenced its lawsuits against ABC and several other defend-
ants on September 13, 2012, by filing a complaint that was 257 pages 
long, thus giving a whole new meaning to the phrase “a short and plain 
statement”—which is all the South Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quire of a complaint.115 The page count does not include the caption or 
the five-page-long table of contents, appendices 1–7 (measuring about 
one inch tall), and exhibits 1–107 (measuring five inches tall). The sum-
mary provided in the “Nature of the Action” section is a relatively con-
cise ten pages, starting as follows: 
This action is brought by BPI to recover for defamation, product 
and food disparagement, tortious interference with business rela-
tionships, and other wrongs committed by Defendants. Defendants 
knowingly and intentionally published nearly 200 false and dispar-
aging statements regarding BPI and lean finely textured beef 
(“LFTB”). Defendants engaged in a month-long vicious, concerted 
disinformation campaign against BPI companies that produced a 
                                                 
 112. Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, Beef Prods., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., No. Civ. 12-
292 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Sept. 13. 2012) [hereinafter BPI Complaint]. 
 113. Id. at 39. 
 114. See infra Part V. 
 115. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-8(a)(1) (2015). 
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safe, nutritious beef that has lowered the cost of lean ground beef 
sold to consumers for 20 years.116 
Claims were asserted against a former employee, Kit Foshee, who 
claims now to be a whistleblower, and the two former USDA employees 
who were critical of the agency’s approval of LFTB, Gerald Zirnstein 
and Carl Custer. Zirnstein coined the term “pink slime” in a 2002 e-mail 
to USDA colleagues.117 Zirnstein also stated in his e-mail: “I do not con-
sider the stuff to be ground beef, and I consider allowing it in ground 
beef to be a form of fraudulent labeling.”118 BPI also sued American 
Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC), ABC News, Inc., and three on-air 
news reporters.119 According to a BPI attorney, “ABC defamed its prod-
ucts by simply calling the beef additive ‘pink slime.’ . . . BPI blames 
ABC for causing consumers to believe the product ‘is some type of un-
healthy and repulsive liquid product that is not even meat.’”120 
In reading the complaint, one cannot avoid recognizing the high 
dudgeon that permeates its every word. Owners of BPI, Eldon and Regi-
na Roth, are depicted as an “American success story”121 who, through 
“30 years of hard work,” were able to grow a “small, family-owned 
group of companies . . . into a very successful enterprise” with annual 
revenues in 2012 of “over $650 million and profits of over $115 mil-
lion.”122 In contrast, the defendants were practically un-American in the 
zeal with which they had sought to tear down this success story, such that 
“the Roth family’s life work, BPI’s future, and the future of BPI’s em-
ployees were turned upside down.”123 According to the complaint, on 
March 7, 2012: 
ABC News, one of the most powerful news outlets in the world, be-
gan a disinformation campaign against BPI and LFTB. The month-
long campaign, in which all Defendants participated, manufactured 
                                                 
 116. BPI Complaint, supra note 112, at 1. 
 117. Moss, supra note 99. Moss won a Pulitzer Prize for explanatory reporting based on this 
and other articles addressing “contaminated hamburger and other food safety issues that, in print and 
online, spotlighted defects in federal regulation and led to improved practices.” The 2010 Pulitzer 
Prize Winners, PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2010-Explanatory-Reporting (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
 118. Moss, supra note 99. 
 119. See Bill Tomson, ABC Sued for “Pink Slime” Defamation, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2012, 
4:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444709004577649552576092254. 
 120. Id. 
 121. BPI Complaint, supra note 112, at 2. 
 122. Id. at 2. 
 123. Id. at 3. But see Moss, supra note 99 (“Headstrong and self-assured, Eldon N. Roth had 
the good fortune to be in the right place at the right time. Mr. Roth spent the 1990s looking to give 
Beef Products a competitive edge by turning fatty slaughterhouse trimmings into usable lean beef.”). 
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a baseless consumer backlash against BPI and LFTB. Through a se-
ries of factual misstatements, repeated continuously during the 
campaign, Defendants knowingly misled the public into believing 
that LFTB was not beef at all, but rather an unhealthy “pink slime” 
“hidden” in ground beef as part of an “economic fraud” master-
minded by BPI.124 
Based on its numerous and detailed allegations, BPI asserted twen-
ty-seven claims.125 The first eighteen claims are based on allegedly false 
statements, including statements that LFTB was “pink slime,” that it was 
not beef, that it was a “filler” or “substitute,” and that LFTB was made 
from beef trimmings “once used only for dog food.”126 The next six 
claims are based on alleged false implications.127 Claim twenty-six is for 
the alleged violation of South Dakota’s Agricultural Food Products Dis-
paragement Act, while the last claim is for tortious interference with 
business relationships.128 
Although there is neither time nor space here to address the allega-
tions in BPI’s complaint in detail, reading all that was alleged would 
leave anyone with the impression that the owners of BPI are on a vendet-
ta of sorts, inspired by what they perceived to be a vendetta first directed 
at BPI. The resulting blood feud is remarkable in a myriad of ways, par-
ticularly for the ferocity with which the views of the media are ex-
pressed. Not only were ABC and its reporters accused of making state-
ments that were outright lies with the malicious intent to advance a “dis-
information campaign,” but they were also accused of “publish[ing] and 
broadcast[ing] a blacklist of grocery store chains that sold ‘pink slime’ to 
their customers.”129 And that was not all: 
The ABC Defendants used the blacklist to create a so-called “grass-
roots movement” against grocery store chains that sold ground beef 
with LFTB, and they actively encouraged consumers to join the 
campaign. Their efforts worked. No grocery store chains wanted to 
be on the blacklist. Nearly every major grocery store chain in the 
country that had been purchasing ground beef that included LFTB 
stopped doing so, even though none of them had complaints about 
quality or safety of LFTB. After years of selling ground beef with 
LFTB, each of the grocery store chains dropped LFTB because of 
                                                 
 124. BPI Complaint, supra note 112, at 3. 
 125. Id. at 138–256. 
 126. Id. at 8. The specific pleadings that set forth these first eighteen claims can be found at 
pages 138–215, with Counts I–IX being for defamation, and X–VIIIX being product disparagement. 
 127. Id. at 8–9; see also id. at 216–45. 
 128. Id. at 9; see also id. at 245–56. 
 129. Id. at 6. 
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the consumer backlash created by the Defendants’ disinformation 
campaign. The chains could not risk being on the blacklist and los-
ing consumers who were making decisions based on Defendants’ 
false information about LFTB.130 
What is perhaps most astounding about these allegations is how lit-
tle credit consumers are given for having intelligence or free will. Even 
though it may be more litigation strategy than a reflection of what the 
owners of BPI or their attorneys really believe, the world depicted by 
BPI’s complaint and subsequent pleadings is one that is populated by 
consumers so easily misinformed that one wonders how any member of 
the public ever makes a decision on his own. Indeed, the assumption ap-
pears to be that no one looking at a photograph of LFTB would ever on 
his own think, “Wow, that looks like pink slime.” Or that no consumer 
learning of the name “pink slime” would ever on his own think, “I don’t 
want to eat ground beef with ammonia-soaked meat in it.” 
In the world that BPI’s complaint depicts, it is the power of the 
name alone—“pink slime”—that prompts consumers to decide to stop 
buying ground beef that contains LFTB. Moreover, this power is created 
ex nihilo—from nothing—by the act and intent of malicious naming. 
Note how BPI explains it: 
When Defendants called LFTB “pink slime,” consumers understood 
that Defendants were indicating that LFTB was a noxious, repul-
sive, and filthy fluid. There is not a more offensive way of describ-
ing a consumable product than to call it “pink slime.” By repeatedly 
referring to LFTB as “pink slime,” Defendants conveyed that LFTB 
was not beef, but instead was an unsafe and unhealthy substance 
that was included in ground beef.131 
That the name “pink slime” has a pejorative slant to it is pretty 
much undeniable, as one court ruling on the issue from an evidentiary 
perspective ruled.132 As this court explained, “The word slime is synon-
ymous with ooze, sludge, muck, mud, or mire. The word implies repul-
sion. Certainly, the word slime does a disservice to the jurors in impart-
                                                 
 130. Id. at 6–7. BPI predictably echoed its allegations in opposing the Motion to Dismiss that 
ABC filed, stating, for example: “In one month, Defendants manufactured a consumer backlash 
against BPI and LFTB that nearly destroyed the enterprise that BPI’s owners, the Roth family, had 
spent a lifetime building.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition to ABC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss All Claims 
of Plaintiff Beef Products, Inc. at 1, Beef Prods., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., No. Civ. 12-292 
(S.D. Cir. Ct. Aug. 9, 2013). 
 131. BPI Complaint, supra note 112, at 58. 
 132. See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., No. 8:11CV270, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 62880 (D. Neb. May 2, 2014) (granting a motion in limine and ordering meat in ques-
tion be referred to as “lean finely textured beef”). 
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ing—not an accurate understanding of the beef product—but a predis-
posed misunderstanding that the meat was unsavory or repulsive.”133 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that describing LFTB as “slime” 
implies a certain sense of repulsion, at least in the speaker, BPI reveals a 
serious failure of imagination in asserting that “[t]here is not a more of-
fensive way of describing a consumable product than to call it 
‘slime’.”134 To the contrary, it seems to me that calling LFTB “pink snot” 
or “pink vomit” packs a much greater offensive punch than the mere use 
of “pink slime.”135 And while it makes sense that a trial court wants to 
avoid prejudice at a trial by prohibiting the use of the term “pink slime” 
in front of jurors, much more should be required to prohibit citizens from 
using the term as part of reasonable discourse about food safety. 
BPI has no more right to stop its critics from calling a product that 
definitely appears to be both pink and slimy “pink slime” than critics 
would have the right to insist that BPI abandon the name “lean finely 
textured beef.” Nor would BPI appear to have a strong basis for com-
plaining that the use of the term “pink slime” unambiguously implied 
that LFTB was unsafe to eat. People are known to eat a lot of slimy 
things that many would deem repulsive and refuse to eat. For example, I 
do not particularly like to eat mangoes because the texture is slimy. On 
the other hand, I love to eat escargot, which many find repulsive. I also 
love cooked oatmeal, which my best friend detests because he thinks the 
texture is slimy. The sliminess of these foods does not imply a lack of 
safety, however. Nonetheless, when the court in the BPI lawsuit ruled on 
the motion to dismiss that ABC and other defendants filed, it concluded 
that “the use of the term ‘pink slime’ with a food product can be reason-
ably interpreted as implying that that food product . . . is not fit to eat, 
which are objective facts which can be proven.”136 The court thus held 
that BPI’s product disparagement claims under South Dakota’s food 
product disparagement statute would not be dismissed at the pleading 
stage of the litigation, leaving open that the defendants could later move 
                                                 
 133. Id. at *2. 
 134. BPI Complaint, supra note 112, at 58. 
 135. Indeed, the other name Custer and Zirnstein gave to LFTB seems in many ways more 
mocking and disgusting—calling it “soylent pink.” See “Pink Slime:” Combo of Connective Tissue, 
Scraps Hidden in Your Kids’ Lunch, FOX NEWS (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/health/ 
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named after the rations (made with an extremely disgusting ingredient) that were fed to people in a 
polluted and overpopulated world. SOYLENT GREEN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1973). 
 136. Beef Prods., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., No. Civ. 12292, 2014 WL 1245307, at *12 
(S.D. Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 2014). 
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for summary judgments.137 The court also held that the disparagement 
statute preempted the common law disparagement claims, meaning that 
five of the counts pleaded would be dismissed.138 Consequently, in the 
months since the court’s ruling, discovery by all parties has gotten un-
derway. 
How the “pink slime” case will ultimately resolve cannot be pre-
dicted with any accuracy. Once discovery is completed, ABC and the 
other defendants will certainly move for summary judgment dismissal of 
all claims. But in light of the trial court’s ruling favorable to BPI on the 
motions to dismiss, it is difficult to imagine the case not going to a jury. 
Regardless of the jury verdict, though, or the results of subsequent ap-
peals, there is no question that BPI has sent a clear signal that the meat 
industry will spend what it takes to fight allegedly defamatory attacks. 
Less clear is what lessons, if any, the USDA may have learned from the 
criticism once again pointed in its direction. As one who has watched the 
agency criticized repeatedly for favoring industry concerns over public 
health, I am not optimistic that this is an agency that can ever put the 
public first. Consequently, unless the public pays closer attention, resists 
the inclination toward magical thinking, and demands more of industry 
and regulators alike, the food we eat will be as the industry chooses to 
make, and the agencies allow it to be made—out of sight, but also out of 
mind. 
VI. CONCLUSION: VISIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY AS PREREQUISITES 
TO FOOD SAFETY AND POSSIBLY PREVENTATIVE OF PUBLIC OUTRAGE 
“But you can always pick it up, and if you’re alone in the kitchen,  
who is going to see?”139 
 
When Julia Child made her famous quip about the purported upside 
to there being a lack of witnesses to a kitchen mishap, she was pointing 
to a key truth about our relationship with food: a significant majority of 
                                                 
 137. Id. at *2 (“[T]he court is not treating the Defendants’ respective 12(b)(5) motions as 
summary judgment motions.”). The court also refused to dismiss the defamation and tortious inter-
ference with business relationship claims. Id. at *25, *29 
 138. Id. at *6 (“Based upon the court’s determination that SDCL Chapter 20-10A preempts 
common law disparagement claims when an agricultural food product such as LFTB is allegedly 
stated to be unsafe for consumption, the court dismisses Counts 10, 14, 15, 16 and 24.”). 
 139. Laura Jacobs, Our Lady of the Kitchen, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2009), 
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cake that she was attempting to flip fell on the counter instead of landing back in the pan where it 
was intended). 
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all that we consume was prepared without our having seen its prepara-
tion. It is for this reason, among many, that eating requires a kind of fun-
damental trust. The play of visibility and invisibility, concealment and 
revelation, deception and disclosure, are what sit at the core of modern 
food production and what define the dynamics of food commerce. Publi-
cation of The Jungle revealed a plethora of disgusting meatpacking prac-
tices; that revelation predictably gave rise to widespread disgust that un-
dermined the public trust in the safety and wholesomeness of meat and, 
as a result, quickly hurt sales. Faced with the loss of profits, and no ef-
fective means to restore consumer confidence, the meat industry did an 
about-face and supported federal inspection of meat, so long as the tax-
payers picked up the tab. 
It has been oft noted that rising public outrage over food safety is 
what creates a necessary precondition for regulatory change. But no one 
has noted the role that revelation has played, and how the power of visi-
bility is what the industry fears most, as evidenced by the continued ef-
forts to pass and enforce laws against calling a product’s safety into 
question or revealing unsafe or inhumane food production practices. The 
food industry understands that its credibility and consumer confidence 
are always inextricably intertwined, plummeting together when ugly 
practices or unsafe conditions are exposed. By suing the persons who 
labeled lean finely textured beef as “pink slime,” BPI has attempted to 
remove that label from the lexicon and silence conversation about the 
presence of that which has the power to disgust, but also the power to 
make ground beef cheaper. The fact that sales of LFTB are on the rise 
again offers proof of the public’s inclination to forget,140 and its prefer-
ence for the kind of magical thinking that keeps the wheels of food 
commerce smoothly spinning, so long as the number of deaths and ill-
nesses linked to food are kept low enough to avoid drawing too much 
attention to the man behind the curtain. 
I did not intend this Article to be a full evaluation of the validity of 
the First Amendment issues that surround and inform the debate of food 
disparagement laws and food libel litigation. I have instead tried to show 
how the food industry and regulators historically have worked in tandem 
to suppress public discussion about the risks posed by food, and that such 
suppression is key to maintaining a level of consumer confidence suffi-
cient for continued profitable sales. In the end, it is the credibility of the 
                                                 
 140. Joyce Russell, “Pink Slime” Is Making a Comeback. Do You Have a Beef with That?, 
NPR BLOG (Feb. 16, 2015, 4:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/06/17/322911060/pink-
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food marketplace and the food sold there that must be protected against 
fears, founded and unfounded. 
Just as the Federal Reserve works to prevent bank runs by bolster-
ing confidence in the soundness of the money supply, so too do the 
USDA and FDA repeat mantra-like the message about how reliably safe 
all food is in the United States. Take, for example, a statement posted on 
the USDA blog by the Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack, which 
reads in part as follows: 
Often during the holiday season, we take time to reconnect with 
family and friends over a meal. We’re able to do so because hard-
working folks in rural America deliver the most abundant and af-
fordable food supply on earth. 
It’s also the safest food supply—an achievement made possible by a 
wide range of skilled, dedicated people. 
It all starts with our growers and processors, who are always asking 
how they can produce a safer product. They have the support of 
USDA staff at more than 6,000 plants around the country and at 
U.S. ports of entry. These experts inspect a wide range of food 
products before they’re sent to the grocery store.141 
That such a statement is, at least in part, propaganda should go without 
saying. But making such statements is also plainly part of the Secretary 
of Agriculture’s job description, as the head of a department charged not 
only with food safety, but also food marketing responsibilities. 
In carrying out its food safety responsibilities, through issuing regu-
lation, inspecting food plants, and making enforcement decisions, the 
USDA has always been complicit in erecting and maintaining the curtain 
that keeps the public from seeing how food is in fact made, a sight that 
most of the public would rather not see anyway.142 When the photo of 
lean finely textured beef began to circulate on the internet, with the de-
scriptive “pink slime” attached, the collective reaction was one of dis-
gust—and predictably so. And when the public learned that this meat 
product was doused in ammonia or citric acid as a means of reducing the 
risk of pathogenic contamination, it is easy to understand that few people 
were instantly reassured. To the contrary, who would not reasonably ask: 
                                                 
 141. Tom Vilsack, Secretary’s Column: Ensuring a Safe Food Supply for Americans, USDA 
BLOG (Dec. 7, 2012, 1:57 PM), http://blogs.usda.gov/2012/12/07/secretarys-column-ensuring-a-safe-
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 142. Pruitt & Anderson, supra note 95 (questioning whether increased transparency and 
knowledge about food production practices would, in fact, “reduce the ‘yuck’ factor, . . . [and] even-
tually lead to consumer acceptance”). 
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If this meat is of a sufficiently high quality such that I can eat it with con-
fidence, why must it be doused with liquid bactericide first? 
Yet, regardless of the answer to this question, it would seem rela-
tively noncontroversial to assert that the public has a right to know what 
is in the food that it eats. And if I find the very thought of eating ground 
beef with LFTB in it repulsive (and I do), then I should be able to suc-
cessfully avoid eating such ground beef. On the other hand, if you are a 
consumer that prizes lower cost, and can find a way to not think about 
the LFTB (or are not in any way bothered by it), then I see no reason 
why you should be kept from buying ground beef made with LFTB. Ei-
ther way, though, the role of the government should be to increase trans-
parency, not decrease it.143 As even commentators friendly to the meat 
industry have noted, “[W]ithout sufficient transparency, a product can be 
rebranded into something seemingly sinister.”144 Moreover, when it 
comes to supporting critical discourse, the agency should be a partici-
pant, not a key suppresser. Ultimately, when the details of food produc-
tion are allowed to remain invisible, the backlash that accompanies reve-
lation is both inevitable and predictable. Being instructed to “ignore that 
man behind the curtain” is not the solution. Instead, the curtain must 
come down, and the reality should be seen. 
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